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Abstract 
This study examines the issue of whether or not state and federal job safety agencies provide the 
same levels of public output. Tests are conducted on the hypothesis that state takeover of 
regulation from the federal program serves to reduce the costs of firms. These costs are comprised 
of two components: the penalties for noncompliance and the uncertainty costs of regulation. The 
public policy implication that is drawn from these tests is that it matters to firms which 
government unit regulates them. 
The Occupatioanal Safety and Health (OSH) Act was enacted in 1970 to 
provide uniform job safety regulation for the nation.1 Prior to the OSH Act, 
regulation was the sole responsibility of states. Some states carried no safety 
laws until recently; the first job safety statute in Texas was enacted in 1967.2 
The OSH Act does not prevent any state from asserting jurisdiction under 
state law when that state is '... at least as effective in providing safe and 
healthful employment and places of employment as the standards promul- 
gated...' under the OSH Act.3 Therefore, states have two options to choose 
from: Leave regulation to the Occupational Safety and Health Administrat- 
ion (OSHA) or provide its own program of regulation. 
States which operate their own programs must first seek approval from 
OSHA. OSHA pays 50 percent of the operating costs of approved state 
programs. Once programs are approved, OSHA retains discretionary en- 
forcement authority for three years while it monitors the performance of 
states. OSHA may then reject programs during this period and the federal 
program would continue. There are 21 states which operate their own 
programs.5 
This paper presents a model which explains why certain states elect to 
operate their own programs. Tests are conducted on the hypothesis that state 
takeover of regulation from the federal program serves to reduce the costs of 
firms. These costs are comprised of two components: the penalties for non- 
compliance and the uncertainty costs of regulation. The policy implications of 
* This paper has benefitted from the construcive comments of Joseph Cordes and Harry Watson. 
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these tests offer insights into the issue of whether or not different government 
units provide the same levels of public output. 
1. Model of state programming 
The rationale for inclusion of state programming in the OSH Act is to provide 
states with the choice between minimum regulation by OSHA or more 
regulation through their own programs. This is consistent with one of the 
goals of the OSH Act which is to specify minimum safety requirements for the 
workplaces of the nation. In order to conclude that state programming 
provides the same level of output as federal, it is necessary to understand what 
incentives exist for states to elect the option of regulating their own work 
environments. One rationale for states to operate their own programs may be 
that firms evaluate the regulatory environments of states.6 For example, if 
there exist two locations where a firm might locate and be equally as well off, 
except for job safety regulatory programs, then it would choose that location 
which offers the lower costs of regulation. This is consistent with the notion 
that the potential entrants of an area purchase environmental, access, phys- 
ical, and public output characteristics. In this case, the cost imposed upon 
firms by regulation is one part of public output characteristics and partly 
determines decisions to locate in an area or not. 
States may respond to this concern of firms. By operating their own 
programs states may be better able to control their public output character- 
istics. There exist at least two possible ways to decrease the costs of regulation 
to firms when states elect to operate their ownjob safety programs. One way is 
to offer firms less stringent enforcement programs than under federal pro- 
gramming. This could take the form of lower probabilities of inspections and 
lower penalties for observed cases of noncompliance relative to the federal 
program. The other is to decrease the uncertainty associated with future 
regulation by offering firms more stable regulatory environments than under 
federal programming. This is one means of lowering the costs associated with 
regulation to firms. If state takeover ofjob safety regulation serves to decrease 
the regulatory costs of firms, then the costs of paying for 50 percent of the 
operating costs of the regulatory program may be outweighed by the benefits 
of increased firm migration, decreased firm outmigration, and the resulting 
increases in jobs, tax revenues, and penalty revenues to states.' For those 
states whose benefits are not expected to outweigh the costs of takeover, this 
model suggests that it is not in their interests to operate their own programs.8 
Four hypotheses on the differences between federal and state programming 
are derived from this model of state programming. First, state programs exert 
lower costs of noncompliance on firms than do federal programs. Second, the 
characteristics of state enforcement programs are more variable than those of 
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federal programs since states which operate their own programs seek to 
individually control their regulatory environments to suit the needs of their 
firms. Third, state programs offer firms a more stable and certain regulatory 
environment over time than do federal programs. Fourth, there is migration 
by firms to states with state programming in response to the expected dif- 
ferences in the regulatory environments of federal and state programs. The 
first three hypotheses are tested in this paper while testing of the fourth 
hypothesis is left for future research in this area. 
2. Tests of differences between federal and state programming 
Before tests of differences between programming are conducted, it is necessary 
to determine whether or not there exists significant differences in levels of 
occupational risk between federal and state programming jurisdictions. Juris- 
diction is of two types - 29 states and the District of Columbia which operate 
under federal programming and the 21 states under state programming. This 
determination is crucial to the testing of the three above hypotheses because it 
is necessary to evaluate only the differences in enforcement programs and not 
the differences in risk in the jurisdictions. For example, higher penalties in 
federal programming may be only the result of higher levels of risk in the states 
under federal programming relative to states under state programming. State 
risk levels are determined by many factors. These factors include the charac- 
teristics of job safety programs and the industrial composition of states. State 
standardized occupational injury and illness incidence rates are used to 
measure risk.' Tests for significant differences between the means and va- 
riances of the jurisdictional levels of risk show that at the 95 percent level of 
confidence the null hypothesis that the average risk in the two jurisdictions are 
not significantly different from each other cannot be rejected. Failure to reject 
the null hypothesis indicates that the workplace environments of the two 
jurisdictions were similar during 1974, 1975, and 1976, and that the tests 
which are conducted below offer useful information on the differences be- 
tween federal and state programming.'0 
2.1 Test of hypothesis 3: Differences between means 
Hypothesis 1 is that state programs exert lower costs of noncompliance on 
firms than do federal programs. Four parameters are chosen to represent 
jurisdictional enforcement programs." The probability of inspection, P, is the 
number of first-time inspections in a given year over the number of firms for 
each state. Average penalties for serious and nonserious violations, F, and F,, 
respectively, are determined by dividing total dollar penalties by the number 
of such violations for each state in appropriate years. A serious violation is 
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Table 1. Means of enforcement parameters by state and federal jurisdiction 
Parameter 1975 1976 1977 
Probability of inspection, P 
State .078 .075 .066 
Federal .023 .024 .015 
Average serious fine, F1 
State $ 488.75 $ 613.54 $421.58 
Federal 590.62 627.89 370.82 
Average nonserious fine, F2 
State $ 206.57 $50.12 $ 77.67 
Federal 44.56 54.60 60.86 
Violations per firm, V 
State .263 .263 .225 
Federal .123 .136 .066 
considered by OSHA to carry a significant probability that death or serious 
harm could result, while a nonserious violation is one that probably would 
not cause serious injury."2 The fourth parameter, V, is the total number of detected violations per firm and serves to measure the intensity of inspections 
in each state. Table 1 displays the means of these enforcement parameters for 
fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977. 
Table 2 displays the test statistics for the null hypothesis that there exists no 
significant difference between the means of enforcement parameters in the two 
jurisdictions between fiscal years 1975 to 1977. The t-statistics are the num- 
bers displayed for means, u. For both P and V the state average is always 
significantly higher than the federal average. For F, and F2 there exist no 
significant differences between state and federal values except for F, in 1975. 
In this year the federal average for F, is significantly higher than the state. 
These results suggest that state programming offers firms a higher level of 
nonmonetary enforcement than under federal programming. The policy im- 
plication is that state programming offers states a means of providing ad- 
ditional regulation over what is provided by OSHA. 
A possible explanation for the finding of significant differences between the 
means of the nonmonetary but not monetary enforcement parameters is that 
administrators of state programs operate under different incentives than the 
administrators of the federal program. State administrators may feel a need to 
justify the existence of their programs to a greater degree than federal admini- 
strators since state governments see these programs as optional and costly in 
terms of providing for 50 percent of their budgets. Therefore, the higher values 
of P and V for state programs may reflect the fact that they wish to present to 
the state legislature the impression that a substantial amount of work is 
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conducted by the state job safety agency. The federal program, though, is not 
optional and serves to impose different incentives on federal administrators. 
One would not expect to find the same result for penalties F1 and F2 since this 
would represent higher monetary costs to firms under state programming. As 
discussed in the model of state programming, this result is not in the interest of 
states which operate their own programs. 
2.2 Test of hypothesis 2: Differences between variances 
Hypothesis 2 is that the characteristics of state enforcement programs are 
more variable than those of federal programs. Tests of differences between the 
variances of the enforcement parameters are used to compare the variability 
of the enforcement programs of the two jurisdictions. Table 2 displays the test 
statistics for the null hypothesis that there exists no significant differences 
between the variances of enforcement parameters in the two jurisdictions 
between fiscal years 1975 to 1977. The numbers displayed for variances, a2, are 
F-statistics. Tests of differences between variances indicate that there exist 
significant differences for all parameters. Moreover, there exists no exception 
to the rule that state jurisdiction displays the higher variance. 
Tests of differences between variances strongly support the hypotheses that 
the characteristics of state enforcement programs are more variable than 
those of federal programs. This indicates that state programs provide less 
uniformity in parameter employment relative to federal programs. In this 
sense, the states which operate their own programs offer firms greater variety 
than those states subject to federal regulation. This result is expected since 
state programs are operated by 21 independent regulatory agencies while 
Table 2. Tests of differences between means and variances of parameters between state and 
federal jurisdiction 
Parameter 1975 1976 1977 
Probability of inspection, P p 3.48* 3.96* 4.00* 
a2 221.21*" 47.30* 79.07* 
Average serious fine, F1 1 2.15** .16 1.04* 
a2 215.05* 2.17* 3.63* 
Average nonserious fine, F2, 1.30 .33 1.56 
a2 1000.14* 15.18* 42.72* 
Violations per firm, V p 2.93* 2.70* 4.53* 
a2 10.51* 3.27* 6.02* 
Note. Absence of an asterisk indicates that the coefficient is insignificant from zero. 
* denotes significance at .01 level. 
** denotes significance at .05 level. 
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federal programs are operated by one federal agency. The policy implication is 
that it does matter to firms which government unit regulates them when we 
consider variability of enforcement. 
2.3 Test of hypothesis 3: Rank correlation 
Tests of rank correlation determine whether or not there exists significant 
degrees of rank correlation between the values of enforcement parameters for 
each jurisdiction. Spearman's test of rank correlation is applied to the data."x 
Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients of rank correlation for the null 
hypothesis that the employment of enforcement parameters is not rank 
correlated between adjoining years. There exists no exception to the rule that 
there exists positive and significant rank correlation between the employment 
of parameters in adjoining years. In six of the eight cases the correlation is 
higher under state programming. The two cases where the correlation is 
higher under federal programming are for penalty parameters. 
Tests of rank correlation supports the hypothesis that state programs offer 
firms a more stable regulatory environment over time and therefore less 
uncertainty than do federal programs. This implies that the ranking of 
Table 3. Rank correlation coefficients between parameters for state and federal jurisdictions in 
adjoining years 
Parameter Adjoining years State Federal 
Probability of inspection, P 1975 + 1976 .84* .57* 
(6.71) (3.73) 
1976 + 1977 .77* .70* 
(5.27) (5.25) 
Average serious fine, F1 1975 + 1976 .49* .52* 
(3.02) (3.27) 
1976 + 1977 .75* .33** 
(4.87) (2.20) 
Average nonserious fine, F2 1975 + 1976 .38** .43** 
(2.25) (2.48) 
1976 + 1977 .71* .48** 
(4.39) (2.53) 
Violations per firm, V 1975 + 1976 .85* .55* 
(6.72) (2.85) 
1976 + 1977 .90* .72* 
(8.89) (4.96) 
* denotes significance at .01 level 
** denotes significance at .05 level. 
t-values in parentheses. 
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stringency among regulatory programs by states is more stable under state 
programming. Therefore, states, by electing to operate their own programs, 
may decrease part of the costs of regulation to firms. The federal program, on 
the other hand, has operated under four different administrators, each of 
whom had attempted to change the focus of the enforcement program. In this 
sense the federal program produces greater uncertainty costs than state 
programs. 
3. Conclusion 
The public policy implication that is drawn from these tests is that it matters to 
firms which government unit regulates them. While there exists no evidence to 
indicate that state programs exert lower monetary costs of noncompliance on 
firms, there does exist evidence which suggests that state programming offers 
higher nonmonetary enforcement activity, lower uncertainty costs, and 
greater variety in regulatory environments than does federal programming. 
For these reasons some states may find it beneficial to operate their own job 
safety programs. The model of state programming suggests at least one 
avenue for regulatory reform. This would be to allow states to operate their 
own programs in all regulatory areas as long as they operate programs which 
are as effective as their federal counterparts. Then state programming offers 
firms a means of lowering their regulatory costs in terms of lowering un- 
certainty while providing at least the average level of enforcement as the 
federal program. 
NOTES 
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970). 
2. See Wood (1976) for a discussion of the status of state job safety regulation prior to 1970. 
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970), Sec. 18.(c)(2). 
4. Program and Policy Series (1975). 
5. Office of State Programs (1977). 
6. This is consistent with the hypothesis in Tiebout (1956) that neighboring localities compete 
with each other for residents. For example, see Oates (1969) for a discussion of municipalities 
competing for residents through tax packages. 
7. Another possible benefit, as felt by state governments, may be that it allows state bureauc- 
racies to grown as they take over safety regulation from OSHA. 
8. An alternative explanation for why some states operate their own programs is that they wish 
to provide workers with greater workplace protection than would be provided by OSHA. 
Higher rates of inspection and penalties relative to the federal program would be evidence of 
this rationale. 
9. Data is obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics (1976). 
10. The lack of data on occupational risk for later years necessarily confines this analysis. 
11. The enforcement data is obtained from Office of Management Data and Statistical Analysis 
(1977). The number of firms in each state is obtained from Office of the President (1973). 
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